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Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account, by W. Mat-
thews Grant. Bloomsbury, 2019. Pp. viii + 248. $114 (hardback).
SIMON KITTLE, University of Leeds
W. Matthews Grant’s Free Will and God’s Universal Causality is a system-
atic presentation and defence of what he calls the Dual Sources account of 
divine and creaturely agency. The Dual Sources account comprises two 
Furlong judges that there are a number of promising responses that do 
not incur serious costs.
Chapter 8 takes up four related challenges to divine determinism, all 
of which stem from the seeming implication of divine determinism that 
God wills our acts of sin or wrongdoing. First, doesn’t God deceive us 
by issuing commands against acts of wrongdoing, implying that they are 
contrary to his will, when all the while he determines that we sometimes 
do them? Second, if God wills that we sometimes commit acts of sin, isn’t 
that incompatible with a common theistic understanding that we should 
conform our actions to God’s will? Third, if our past sins have been willed 
by God, won’t we be opposing ourselves to God’s will if we repent of 
them? Fourth, isn’t it absurd for God to blame and punish us for sinful 
acts that he determines us to perform? Furlong explores a number of pos-
sible responses, judging, once again, that the objections can be answered, 
but that doing so involves certain costs.
Throughout most of the book, Furlong sets himself to “examine the log-
ical space in which divine determinists might stake out their positions, 
rather than constructing, proposing, and defending a particular view” 
(220). In the brief conclusion, however, in addition to revealing his own 
agnosticism regarding divine determinism, he reveals a bit more regard-
ing which lines of reply he finds most promising in response to each 
objection, and which objections would worry him most were he a divine 
determinist. He also offers some helpful remarks regarding the nature 
of philosophical disputes in which conflicts of intuition can have such a 
strong influence on what disputants are prepared to acknowledge as a 
reasonable position to hold.
The Challenges of Divine Determinism is a book that presents challenges 
mostly to divine determinists, but indeterminists may find themselves 
challenged as well. It is a rewarding read, and a significant contribution to 
contemporary philosophy of religion.




key ideas: first, that God causes all entities other than himself (Divine 
Universal Causality, or DUC); second, that God’s actions consist in noth-
ing other than the causal relationship between God and the effect and 
the effect itself (which Grant dubs the Extrinsic Model of divine agency). 
Grant contends that the Extrinsic Model of divine agency shows how 
Divine Universal Causality is consistent with the following pair of 
claims: one, created causes are genuine, efficacious causes (i.e., the denial 
of occasionalism), and two, human free will (understood as requiring 
the ability to do otherwise, all antecedent conditions held constant) is 
incompatible with determinism. Grant locates his work squarely in the 
“neoscholastic” or “broadly Thomistic” tradition (11, 71). Within that 
tradition, Grant is allied to those who defend the claim that while God’s 
causation of created events is logically sufficient for those events, God’s 
causing created events does not amount to God’s determining those 
events. Many incompatibilists will, I think, be unconvinced by Grant’s 
arguments for that conclusion and thus see the work as a defence of a 
form of theological compatibilism combined with natural incompatibi-
lism. But whether or not Grant has successfully shown that his view is 
not deterministic, his book is a clear, concise, and technical work which 
poses a significant challenge to those who maintain that God’s universal 
sufficient causation is a threat to creaturely agency and/or creaturely 
free will. What will be refreshing to many readers—especially philos-
ophers—is that Grant’s book is a serious engagement with the relevant 
metaphysics. It is not uncommon to defend the compatibility of divine 
universal sufficient causation with creaturely agency and/or creaturely 
free will by making what is, in effect, a front-and-centre appeal to mys-
tery. Often this move proceeds as follows: explain that God’s transcend-
ence means God’s causing is sui generis (37), on a “different level,” or 
similar, and that it must therefore be understood analogically; apply the 
terms “causes,” “wills,” “brings about” (or your verb of choice) to God 
analogically on the aforementioned grounds; reject any of the standard 
corollaries that would follow given univocal predication but which one 
finds theologically problematic (e.g., that no two independent causes 
can each cause the entirety of a given effect); accept those theologically 
desirable corollaries (e.g., that causing bestows control); or deflect away 
further objections as (at best) theologically naïve or (at worst) idolatrous 
(71) attempts to reduce God to a cause among causes. Though there are 
hints that Grant would like to reserve the right to fall back to such a posi-
tion (37, 70–72), it does not feature prominently. Instead, Grant offers a 
sophisticated account of the metaphysics of divine agency (the Extrinsic 
Model) and an account of how this model purports to reconcile Divine 
Universal Causality with created causal efficacy and creaturely free will. 
Grant’s work is bolstered by a tightly argued consideration of numer-
ous objections. The clarity of the writing makes it a pleasure to engage 
with the work, and the scope of topics addressed render it a top-notch 
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addition to the literature. Anyone interested in the topic of divine and 
creaturely agency—even those who struggle to make sense of the work’s 
foundational scholastic assumptions—will, I  suspect, benefit from a 
detailed reading of the work.
The book consists of eight chapters. The first lays out the basic position 
which Grant labels the doctrine of divine universal causality (DUC):
Necessarily, for any entity distinct from God, God directly causes that entity 
to exist at any time it exists. (4)
“Entity” is read broadly to include items in ontological categories other 
than substances, e.g., events, processes, and so on. Grant affirms that 
creaturely causes are efficacious, or, put otherwise, explicitly denies occa-
sionalism (35–39). He calls the resulting position non-occasionalist divine 
universal causality, or NODUC for short (35). Also important in the first 
chapter is Grant’s understanding of determinism:
Determinism . . . requires that there be a certain sort of relationship between 
any determined event, or determinatum, and its determinans, or thing deter-
mining it; namely, the determinans must be prior to the determinatum and 
must be a sufficient condition for the determinatum (6).
Crucially, Grant allows a broad reading for “prior to” which encom-
passes both temporally prior determinans and determinans that are prior “in 
the order of dependence or explanation” but not temporally (6). “Sufficient 
condition” is understood as logically sufficient condition. These defini-
tions preclude any attempt to escape the worry incompatibilists have by 
stressing the synchronous or atemporal nature of God’s causation and as 
such they will likely be acceptable to Grant’s main opponents.
The second chapter presents five reasons for endorsing DUC: Scripture, 
perfect being theology, a contingency-based cosmological argument, a 
divine conservation/concurrence-based argument, and an argument from 
a Thomist metaphysics of being. These arguments are, as Grant acknowl-
edges, inconclusive; moreover, they are not all distinct (e.g., the fourth 
relies on perfect being theology) and some rely on substantial assump-
tions (e.g., a Thomist understanding of being). Nevertheless, as Grant 
notes, many theists will find “one or more compelling” (33) and for that 
reason alone it is useful to have these different routes to DUC spelled out.
Chapters 3 through 5 form the foundation of the book, with subsequent 
chapters applying the account laid out there. Chapter 3 sees Grant defend 
the claim that DUC does not rule out creaturely agency and so does not 
entail occasionalism. Grant maintains that, in addition to God’s causing 
every created being, the whole of each creaturely action is caused directly 
by God (35, 39). Creatures also cause their effects, of course. But God and 
the creature do not cooperate in producing some effect by, for example, 
each producing some part or aspect of the effect (36). Rather, both the crea-
ture and God bring about the whole effect (39). This is not to say they do 
so equally. The creaturely action is “subordinate to God” in the sense of 
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being conditional on God’s concurrence with the creature’s action; moreo-
ver, God causes not just the creature and the creaturely effect, but also the 
creature’s causing of that effect (38–39).
Given the centrality of this claim to Grant’s project—arguably, if 
Grant’s defence of this view of divine concurrence is successful, many 
of his other claims follow relatively straightforwardly—it is worth con-
sidering in more detail. Grant addresses three types of objection to the 
above position: metaphysical, epistemic, and those to do with the nature 
of agent-causation (41–51). I submit that the metaphysical objections are 
the most powerful and I will therefore focus on Grant’s response to this 
class of objection. Using the example of a fire which heats up some water, 
Grant begins by characterising the metaphysical objection as holding that 
“it is literally impossible for the heat to be brought about by God and also 
by the fire” (41). But, Grant suggests, there does not seem to be anything 
contradictory in the following state of affairs:
(S) The fire brings about the heat in the water, and God brings about whatever exists 
in the fire’s bringing about the heat in the water.
Moreover, Grant says he will assume that both conjuncts are inde-
pendently possible, and only consider arguments for thinking the 
impossibility results from their conjunction. This is a puzzling move 
because the second conjunct entails the first and, arguably, itself 
includes the alleged contradiction. If God brings about whatever exists 
in the fire’s bringing about the heat in the water, then God brings about at 
least three things: the fire, the heat in the water, and the causal relation-
ship between the fire and the heat in the water (that is, the fire’s own 
bringing about of the heat). From the second conjunct alone, then, we 
have God’s bringing about the heat—which for Grant, recall, consists 
in God’s directly (i.e., not using the fire) causing the heat—and the fire’s 
own bringing about the heat. And this just is what the objector is alleg-
ing is impossible.
For those who feel that there is something to this objection, Grant’s 
subsequent discussion, although detailed, will likely prove unsatisfac-
tory. For example, one reason he considers for thinking the conjunction 
is impossible is that one might conceive of causation as the supplying 
of a finite quantity of something needed to bring about some effect 
(41). Given this, the objector’s point is that if God directly causes the 
entirety of the state of the world at every instant, God has “saturated” 
the world with his causal power and thereby made all other causes 
otiose: there is simply nothing left for any other putative cause to do 
(41). Grant dismisses this thought on the grounds that we have little 
reason to think the model of causation it was based upon—the sup-
plying of a finite quantity needed for an effect—is an accurate descrip-
tion of how all bringing about works (42). But in response the objector 
will likely push back as follows: that model of causation was explicitly 
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introduced as nothing more than a toy model of causation with the sole 
purpose of making vivid the alleged contradiction and—crucially—the 
objection goes through just fine without it. Ultimately, the metaphysical 
objection stems from what it is to cause the entirety of something, or 
what it is to bring something about: roughly, if agent A  brings about 
E, then no other agent brings about E, unless (i) they do so indirectly/
mediately by bringing it about that A brings about E, or (ii) the other 
agent is also one of the causes of E (alongside A), in which case it would 
strictly speaking be false that A brought about E (and true instead that 
A together with some other agent brought about E). Since (i) is ruled out 
because God causes everything directly and (ii) is ruled out because 
God and the creature supposedly each cause the entirety of the effect, 
the apparent contradiction remains. The objector who feels the force 
of the alleged contradiction, then, will likely remain unconvinced that 
the metaphysical objection has been adequately addressed—or even 
adequately stated. (For two further metaphysical arguments against 
concurrence that Grant does not address see the first and second of 
Peter Olivi’s arguments listed by Gloria Frost (“Peter Olivi’s Rejection 
of God’s Concurrence,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 
(2014): 655–679, 666–668)).
In Chapter 4, Grant contends that NODUC is consistent with holding 
that human free will is incompatible with determinism. In other words, 
Grant holds that although God’s causing E is a logically sufficient condi-
tion for E (55), it is not also a determining condition for E (60–61). Grant 
presents the Extrinsic Model of divine agency—defended at length in 
Chapter 5—in support of these claims. The Extrinsic Model of divine 
agency is motivated by a desire to provide an account of divine agency 
that is compatible with divine simplicity and the idea that God is not 
really but only rationally related to creatures (56). Obviously, for those 
who doubt the coherence of divine simplicity or the rational-only view of 
relations, this won’t be motivation to adopt the view. But for those who 
find themselves able to make head or tail of said doctrines, Chapter 5 
will be a useful defence of a model of agency suited to these positions. 
Grant’s Extrinsic Model of divine agency states that God’s actions con-
sist in nothing intrinsic to God but entirely in the causal relationship that 
holds between God and the effect and the effect itself (58–59). Each crea-
turely substance or event is, on this model, one of God’s undetermined, 
basic actions (61). Grant thinks the last point warrants the assertion that 
God’s action is not prior to the created substance or event, and therefore 
not a determining condition of the created substance/event (60, 62–63). 
Because the Extrinsic Model affirms that God has reasons for everything 
he causes (58), we can truthfully say, for any existing entity, that “God 
brings about E intentionally,” “God wills E,” and “God chooses E” (58). 
Thus, for example, God’s decision to create and sustain (say) my bicycle, 
just is the causal relation which holds between God and my bike together 
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with the bike itself; the material object which is my bike, then, partly con-
stitutes God’s deciding or choosing to create the bike, according to the 
Extrinsic Model—either that or a non-realist stance must be taken towards 
God’s willing and choosing. As space limitations preclude detailed com-
ment, the following remark must suffice: if it is difficult to see how it is 
possible for one event to be caused in its entirety by a created cause and 
also caused in its entirety by God, then it is all the more difficult to see how 
an event such as a human decision could be a basic action of two agents: 
the human and God. Our ordinary concepts of decision and action seem to 
speak against this possibility and it appears that Grant’s account, despite 
its sophistication, doesn’t so much as explain how this is possible as it 
does merely assert that it is so.
The remaining three chapters consider how Grant’s account of divine 
and human agency relates to the problems of God’s potential causal 
involvement and thus responsibility for sin (Chapter 6), God’s permis-
sion of sin and moral evil (Chapter 7), and several specific problems 
in the doctrine of providence (Chapter 8). Grant’s treatment of each 
of these topics is careful and considered. In Chapter 6, Grant employs 
the privation defence to argue that while God causes the act of sin, 
he does not cause the sin itself, since the sin consists in a lack of con-
formity to the moral standard (101–102), which DUC does not require 
God cause. This is a solid defence of the privation view and does not 
depend on the finer details of Grant’s Extrinsic Model of divine agency. 
In his treatment of the problem of moral evil, Grant argues that given 
his account of divine agency, the free will defence fails (120–122). This 
will not be surprising to those incompatibilists who will be inclined to 
view Grant’s account, pace Grant himself, as a version of theological 
determinism. In its place, Grant suggests several possible reasons God 
may have for allowing evil (125–126) but cautions that these are offered 
“with a healthy dose of skeptical theism” (124). The bulk of Chapter 7 
argues that the Dual Sources account is no worse off than Molinism or 
Open Theism with respect to God’s permission of evil. In Chapter 8, the 
distinctive features of the Dual Sources account again come to the fore 
as Grant rounds off his book with a treatment of topics that typically 
fall under the heading of divine providence, namely, those of grace and 
free will, predestination, and divine-human dialogue. Throughout the 
work, Grant’s argumentation is intricate and sustained and the result is 
a comprehensive treatment not only of Grant’s central topic—the nature 
of divine agency and its relation to creaturely agency—but also of many 
related theological topics.
